Concerned about the EU's apparent lack of cultural legitimacy, EU institutions have increasingly engaged in the transnational politics of history to enhance European identity and foster EU legitimacy. The House of European History museum project in Brussels marks a high point in the European Parliament's history politics. Based on document analysis and interviews, an analysis of the project's origins and evolution highlights the narrow limits of cultural engineering from above, by EU institutions, however. The constraining dissensus in EU politics has forced the European Parliament to rely entirely on the curators and professional historians to legitimize its museum as one that conforms to prevailing curatorial and historical standards. As a result, the first permanent exhibition differs markedly from the original plan. Its narrative has become East Europeanized and the history of European integration proper has been marginalized.
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'A single museum to include and represent European civilization … would need to be shaped by genius, not by a committee' -this is how Kenneth Hudson, a British curator and museum entrepreneur, conceived of a museum of European history back in 1997 (cited in Vovk van Gaal and Itzel 2012, 77) . Museum by committee it shall be, nevertheless concluded Hans-Gert Pöttering, then President of the European Parliament (EP), when he first proposed the creation of such a museum in 2007 and charged a Committee of Experts with drafting a plan for a structure and narrative for it. This House of European History (HEH), as it has become known, is currently scheduled to open in Brussels in the Spring of 2017.
The HEH as a major cultural institution to be housed in the Eastman Building close to the EP is a key project for attempts by EU institutions since the 1980s to strengthen the cultural basis for integration, enhance European identity and foster the legitimacy of the EU.
The transformation from a permissive consensus, which characterized the first 25 years of 'core Europe' integration, to what has recently been coined 'constraining dissensus' (Hooghe and Marks, 2009) , and the rise of euroscepticism appear to require such EU activism to shape a collective identity among citizens to protect the EU. Whereas the EU's activism initially focussed on strengthening the organisation's symbolic properties (Manners, 2011) , the Commission and the EP have increasingly concentrated on co-shaping the transnational politics of history -initiatives geared towards fostering the formation and dissemination of more aligned and consensual narratives. The focus here is particularly on the highly divisive 20th-century European history -particularly following the 2004 Eastern enlargement, when memory entrepreneurs -actors who actively seek to shape remembrance policies and collective memory -from Eastern Europe began to challenge the emerging Western European elite consensus around notions of the singularity of the Holocaust and post-war 'core Europe' integration as a peace project (Mälksoo, 2009 ).
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The European Commission has run, among other initiatives, the 'Active European Remembrance' programme (Littoz-Monnet, 2012) . It has also managed the project 'New Narrative for Europe' initiated by the EP and geared towards developing a new storyline to legitimize European integration and the EU (Kaiser, 2015) . The EP has increasingly become involved in history politics as an institutional memory entrepreneur (Kaiser, 2012; Neumayer, 2015) . It has passed several resolutions on European history, especially on the Hitler-Stalin Pact and the start of the Second World War in 1939 (European Parliament, 2009) , which introduced 23 August as a Europe-wide so-called Remembrance Day 'for victims of all totalitarian and authoritarian regimes'. The HEH now marks a high point of the EP's activism.
It seems that the process of Europeanisation was 'looking for a museal form', as Claus Leggewie observed when Pöttering made his proposal (cited in Assmann et al., 2008, p. 78) .
The EP President was in any case keen to give it that particular form.
Using process tracing (see, for example, Vennesson and Wiesner, 2014) From the first to the second phase the project has undergone substantial changes in regard to the dominant actors, the preferred process of deliberation about the contents and the resulting 4 narrative. The project's origins were dominated by a micro-network of Catholic German Christian Democrats. During the second phase, however, the EP gave the team of curators and the Academic Committee a lot of leeway to change the original plans for the museum. At no point did the EP seek to exert direct influence over the museum's content and narrative. The plan's initiators and the EP Bureau measured the project's 'success' purely in terms of securing strong EP majority support for it, its actual implementation and the opening of the museum.
Moreover, during the first phase the Committee of Experts advocated instigating a broad political and public debate about the museum, its content and narrative. In contrast, Pöttering and his successors colluded with the team of curators and the Academic Committee in the second phase to prevent any public debate about the museum at all to avoid political controversies and secure funding for the HEH in the EP.
The Committee of Experts, finally, advocated a longue durée representation of the history of Europe since Antiquity, which would still have centred on post-war European integration. In contrast, the permanent exhibition has shifted the focus to the short-term perspective on Europe since the 19th century. However, (Western) European integration proper has become marginalized.
The activism of EU institutions in the cultural field has been analyzed as attempts at top-down cultural engineering (Shore, 2000) comparable to 19th-century national integration and nation-state formation. Analyzing the HEH experience, however, this article argues that EU institutions are severely constrained in their history politics by the growing political dissensus and the associated need to accommodate the cultural milieu and the preferences and practices of curators and historians. The HEH outcome in other words reflects the limited power of EU institutions to develop and disseminate cohesive narratives of the history of Europe and European integration, which could potentially contribute to the transnational 5 convergence of European remembrance strategies and collective memory and the strengthening of European political identity. In fact, the EP has been so sensitive to the possible accusation of wasting taxpayers' money on a prestige propaganda project to tell a teleological story about European integration that it relied entirely on the curators and professional historians (Vovk van Gaal and Dupont, 2012, p. 47) to legitimize its museum as one that conforms to prevailing curatorial and historical standards.
Catholic Micro-network for a European Integration Museum
Putting 'Europe' in a history museum is not an innocent practice. The museum as a medium for forming and disseminating narratives about individual and collective experience constitutes an 'identity factory' (Korff and Roth, 1990) . Increasingly, museums see their role as mediators in societal and political debates. It sometimes even appears that museums are given 'a responsibility to fix the situation' (Conn, 2010, p. 9) . Historically, they were created to invent, strengthen and celebrate national master-narratives (Anderson, 1983) . Many museums have critically re-evaluated the underlying nationalist projects and are continuing to do so (Porciani, 2012) . They seek to transnationalize their narratives in the light of the growing ethnic and cultural diversity of societies, ongoing processes of Europeanisation and globalisation, and the growth of city tourism with the resulting increase in foreign visitors.
However, history museums do not incorporate organized forms of 'Europe', and of European integration in the present-day EU, in a meaningful way as part of the transnational revision of their narratives (Kaiser et al., 2014) . The European Commission noticed this absence of 'Europe' and European integration from national museums as early as 1977. At that time, the Commission started to advocate a stronger role of the European Communities in preserving and propagating European cultural heritage (Calligaro, 2013, pp. 79-116; LittozMonnet, 2007 (Mazé, 2009) . But the Belgian project lacked institutional support (Mazé, 2014 Kühnhardt, 2005, p. 137) . It was only Pöttering's election to the EP presidency, however, which allowed both men to launch the proposal in a suitable institutional framework. In March and September 2007 Kühnhardt 7 drafted two papers on the topic for use by Pöttering (Interview Kühnhardt; Kühnhardt, 2007) .
He did not become a member of the Committee of Experts, but arranged a visit to the House of History in Bonn for members of the EP Bureau. The Bonn museum director Hütter used this opportunity to argue for his museum, and its combination of a chronological and thematic narrative, as a model for the future museum focused on the history of Europe and European integration. Hütter, who is also a Catholic CDU member, had been active in local party politics in Mönchengladbach until he was appointed director of the Bonn museum.
The core of the micro-network behind the HEH project therefore consisted of only three individuals -all of them Catholic members of the CDU from the western borderlands of Germany. Their preferences for European integration were largely shaped by the Christian democratic federalist tradition and the policy of Western integration pursued by the Catholic German chancellors Adenauer and Kohl (Kaiser, 2007) . As a consequence they were keen to use the future museum for strengthening the EU's cultural integration and political legitimacy. Roszkowski 'luckily lacked interest and engagement' however, 3 and did not try to disrupt the project in the EP.
Pöttering was keen to use the concept paper to be prepared by the Committee of Experts for shoring up support for his project in the EP. He focused his attention entirely on managing the EP process. In contrast, the Committee of Experts discussed in depth the desirable process for setting up the museum and developing the permanent exhibition. Against the background of their own controversial discussions about appropriate narratives of the history of Europe and European integration, the committee members stated clearly that their report should form 'the starting point, and not the conclusion, of a comprehensive public debate, and that this should take place not only in the parliamentary bodies, with MEPs and in administrative circles, but should also involve academics and museum specialists and the general public.' 4 Their plea for such a public debate was strongly informed by the German experience of the House of History in Bonn. When Chancellor Kohl first proposed the idea upon taking power in 1982, it was sharply criticized as a propaganda tool for the 'spiritual and moral renewal' that he proclaimed. Subsequently, however, Heiner Geißler, the more centrist and intellectual CDU Secretary General succeeded in removing the project from partisan conflict by facilitating a broad cross-party and public debate about its objectives and appropriate narrative.
Longue Durée Narrative with a Focus on Post-war European Integration
When they started work, the Committee of Experts had a natural reference point for their proposal for the future museum's narrative in 'C'est notre histoire!' (Tempora, 2007) .
Tempora staged this exhibition to propagate their museum project and showcase how its section on post-war European integration might look. As a result of this focus on the time after 1945, this temporary exhibition lacked the long-term perspective since the high middle ages which characterized the larger project for a Musée de l'Europe. Moreover, the exhibition largely failed to contextualize post-war 'core Europe' integration in the present-day EU within the Cold War and decolonisation. Its narrative method drew on the combined strategies of personalisation and personification (Kaiser, 2011) . The first room sought to personalize the origins of 'core Europe'. It told the story of eight so-called founding fathers of European integration. Throughout the rest of the exhibition, however, the organizers complemented this form of personalisation with the personification of European integration reflecting a broader shift in history museums towards telling stories of acting or suffering, but of unknown individuals (Thiemeyer, 2010, p. 146) . Here, the exhibition told stories about 27 individual citizens, one from each EU Member State at the time -stories that were all related in one way or another to these individuals' own experience of, or contribution to, integration in a larger societal as well as political sense. Such personification can introduce an emotional touch into the museum, which has the potential to attract visitors who can identify with these ordinary citizens. The committee members agreed on a number of key points of the museum's future narrative which they summarized in their final report (Committee of Experts, 2008; Mazé, 2009; Settele, 2015; Siepmann, 2012) . First of all, they rejected the idea reiterated in a letter to Hütter by committee member Giorgio Cracco, Professor of Ecclesiastical History at the University of Turin, to include one room per EU Member State to present its national history.
All other committee members believed instead that the HEH 'cannot be a summation of regional and national histories, but must draw attention to the main points and themes of European history '. 6 Secondly, unlike the Musée de l'Europe project, which proposed to start its narrative in the high middle ages, the committee agreed on a longer-term perspective on European history beginning with Greek and Roman history, not the origins or spread of Christianity. (Sternberger, 1990) borrowed from the discourse about the (West) German political system and identity since the 1960s.
The Musée de l'Europe, thirdly, had a clear notion of historical evolution. According to its narrative plan (Tempora, 2003) , Europe has alternated between phases of unity and of 
Curators and Historians Co-operating on a European History Museum
As it turned out, the work of the Committee of Experts did not create significant path- 
European Integration Lost in Narrative Translation
The changing actor constellation and the deliberate strategy to avoid a broader public debate about the museum during the second phase strongly impacted on the permanent exhibition's 
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Their procedural decision however accentuated the ghettoization of the history of European integration, which is not integrated organically with other sections to illustrate its wider political, economic and social impact.
To some extent the HEH's permanent exhibition has been shaped by the choice of the Eastman Building and its renovation. Its seven levels have invited a chronological spatial division as recommended by the Academic Committee, 10 from (after two entrance levels) levels 2 to 6, the top floor atrium, where the exhibition ends with a section entitled 'Looking Ahead' (European Parliament, 2014) . While such a division could invite a teleological narrative about Europe's upwards evolution through different stages, as in the Musée de l'Europe's idea of phases of unity and conflict, the HEH uses level 2 for a basic introduction to some themes of European history and the structure of the exhibition, before proceeding on While adopting the totalitarianism paradigm for the 'highly sensitive' comparison of two political systems, the exhibition highlights that the Nazi and Stalinist regimes were nevertheless 'not equal' and 'very different in their ideological roots and goals'. 
